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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
********** 
"As a general rule, we tend to overestimate the Russians capacity 
to move from the perception of a new requirement to the successful 
development of the measures to meet it in either technological or 
operational terms; in most respects this capacity lags far behind 
that of the United States. This means that we often link the wrong 
cause and effect. The problem of perceiving the real situation is 
further complicated by our tendency to assess Soviet naval policy in 
terms of Western vulnerabilities instead of trying to identify 
Russia's maritime interests and requirements. We are prone to 
credit the military capability which the Russians claim publicly for 
their fleet, while ignoring the evidence of the Sovet's own internal 
assessments, and their traditional policy of sending weapons systems 
to sea before they are operationally effective." 
Michael MccGwire, "Turning Points in Naval Policy Formation", in Soviet 
Naval Developments, p. 179. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Probably one of the most surprising articles this editor has read in 
some month~' appeared in a recent Naval Intelligence Support Center translation of the 
Soviet Naval Digest, MORSKOY SBORNIK. This December 13, 1972 publication contained an 
article on command at sea written by Captain 1st Rank V. Makarov who is a cruiser 
commanding officer in the Soviet Navy. There is a striking resemblance between the 
ideas expressed in this article and Command At Sea written by Harley Cope and published 
by the Naval Institute. Due to the length o~the article editing was utilized to 
bring out the main points of the paper. These translations are available in the 
magazine section of the library. 
FEATURE: THEY HAVE APPOINTED YOU COMMANDING OFFICER OF A SHIP 
A remarkable event has happened in your life: they have appointed you commanding 
officer of a ship. You have still not yet assumed this billet, but already you 
thoughtfully see how a warship--an integrated complex of men, machinery, and armament--
being fully subordinate to your will, knowledge, and talent, successfully carries out 
the missions assigned to it, accurately hits targets, and is always ready to protect 
the interests of the Motherland. And the more you think about it, the more vividly 
you strive to imagine all of this, the more deeply you are aware what a vast responsibility 
lies on your shoulders, and what a great trust has been placed in you. Indeed now you 
are not only "~he direct head of the entire ship's company" (Navy Shipboard Regulations 
Art. 126) with all of the attendant consequences, you are not only responsible for 
everything connected with the combat readiness and combat capability of the ship and the 
execution of the missions which confront it, but you are also obliged in cases not 
covered by regulations and orders to act "weighing the circumstances ••• according to 
your own-' judgement, observing the interests and dignity of the USSR." 
(Nav. Ship. Regs, Art. 128). Being the solitary head, the CO of a ship not only commands 
subordinates, but he also educates them, and is occupied with their ideological growth; 
together with his Deputy for Political Affairs he guides the entire social-political life 
of the personnel, directs the work of the Party and Komsomol organizations, and decides 
questions of an economic, legal, and diplomatic nature. Therefore, the command of a ship 
is a complex and responsible duty which far from every officer in the Navv is entrusted 
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with and for which one must train himself long and thoroughly. 
A ship command--this is personal courage, ideological steadfastness, tactical 
maturity, accurate visual analysis, and initiative •••• 
In the Baltic they still recall with great respect the CO of one of the first Guards 
ships--the minelayer OSA--Captain 1st Rank N. Mashcherskiy. In training and educating 
subordinate officers more than once he said: When you are ordered to command a ship 
and you detect deficiencies in the organization of the shipboard ranks, in the contents 
of the equipment, and in the discipline, make note of them yourself, but in any case 
do not put them in order right away. And, of course, do not make hasty conclusions 
on the bad work of your predecessor and restrain yourself from making statements left 
and right of your dis-satisfaction to him. This will bring you nothing but concern, 
not to speak of the damage to your uniformed authority." More than one generation of '::J 
commanding officers has been convinced by their own experience of the correctness of 
these words •••• 
As for confidence in subordinates, it is impossible to serve aboard ship without it. 
Some CO's try to do everything themselves: inspect the daily muster, talk with those 
on report, receive foremen from the repair enterprises to decide the question, let ! s 
say, of replacing parts in some kind of machinery, to direct the actions of the 
anchor detail in cleaning the anchor, and so on and so forth. Everything himself, 
himself, himself. But one man cannot do everything. The CO must be able to see the 
main points in his work and, being guided by the requirements of the Navy Shipboard 
Regulations (where the functional duties of every crew member are clearly defined), to 
direct the activities of his assistants and the department heads and through them, the 
entire crew. For example, the Executive Officer is charged with the drilling of the 
day's duty watch--so let him drill it. And he should not be replaced, even in trying 
to do everything better. The appropriate shipboard specialist should be engaged in 
the repair of machinery, and the CO hardly needs to replace him in contacts with 
repairmen. 
One must trust his subordinates, depend on them and constantly teach them, but at 
the same time control them. Monitoring the execution of orders and directives must 
lie at the base of the CO's work. An irreconcilability to deficiencies is formed by 
his will and an intolerance of the slightest transgression with respect to service and 
especially with regard to violations of discipline are made evident to subordinates •••• 
Under todays conditions by concern for subordinates we mean the solution of problems 
not just of daily nature, but also improving the combat readiness of ships, improving 
the organization of combat and political training, and developing. in the entire 
personnel habits for surmounting the difficulties of naval service and the ability to 
achieve vitory with a minimum of losses. 
Concern for subordinates also includes the commanding officer's attention to those 
questions which worry subordinates. It appeared at first that from the "heights of 
command authority" these problems seemed to me to be trifles. However, life has shown 
that at times what are important matters to a nonrated or rated men lie in these 
trivia. Therefore today in discussing complaints and applications, I consider nothing 
a trifle and unworthy of attention. 
Before even assuming command, a CO must seriously think about the execution of 
his own numerous and difficult duties enumerated in Art. 127 of the Navy Shipboard 
Regulations. To take only an example, the training of subordinate officers, their 
preparation for the next rung on the service ladder. Indeed the mission of a CO is 
not to tell them well known truths, but to skillfully and patiently trasmit all of 
your own knowledge and experience. 
Unfortunately, sometimes a CO in training an Executive Assistant or watch officer, 
let's say, for independent conning of the ship, entrusts him to perform one evolution 
or another, but in the process of its execution he interferes with the actions of the 
trainee every minute, because he is not doing it according to the CO's custom. As a 
result, the officer does not learn anything, because he is deprived of his initiative 
and independence. In my view, it is more useful after theoretical training and instruction 
to give the student a mission and his independence. The CO, standing alongside, 
attentively observes the actions of the student, but interferes with them only if the 
threat of an emergency situation arises. And only after the execution of the evolution 
is a thorough critique of his actions made. There is no doubt that the pupil is 
executing " the mission in his own way, not just like the CO, but the schooling of the CO 
and his experience, reflecting the individuality of the officer, will necessarily be 
felt in actions (remember "Lazarev's school", "Nakhimov's school" and "Butakov's 
school".) Moreover, the granting of independence inculcates the subordinate with a 
personal feeling of responsibility for the execution of the order or mission. 
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A CO will not be able to teach subordinates unless he is head and shoulders above 
them, more experienced and erudite. For this he must constantly be concerned about his 
own ideological growth, improving his knowledge, and expanding his horizons, using all 
of the available forms for this: the CO's training system, self-education, exchange 
of experience, and training in higher training institutions. Today a ship's CO as 
never before needs deep knowledge over a wide range--from maritime practice to 
nuclear physics, and from methods of conducting combat operations at sea to international 
maritime law--because on the level of his knowledge depend the level of training of 
subordinates and the quality of the ship's execution of its missions. 
It is quite natural that a ship's CO cannot be a poor sailor, and cannot fail to 
love and know the sea. If prior to a cruise he does not feel a spiritual uplifting, some 
sort of special happiness the expectation of encountering the elements and is only 
subordinating himself to service needs, he will hardly succeed in creating an ·optimal 
business-like mood in the crew. It is boring to sail with such a CO, and it is tedious 
to carry out combat exercises. Therefore, it seems to me that the ship's CO must 
not only be physically prepared, but also know maritime pratice, the ship's equipment 
and its technical specifications outstandingly, be able to conn the ship beautifully 
and precisely, and competently guide the employment of the combat and technical 
equipment. And if he manages to do this, then undoubtedly he will receive, although 
they will not say it out loud, a high mark from his subordinates, and will increase 
his authority, not to mention the fact that his example will influence all the ship's 
officers. 
The commanding officer of a ship, like all officers of the Navy, without fail, 
must possess such qualities as a high degree of "Part y-mindedness" , a deep knowledge of 
Marxism-Leninism, and political maturity, he must have a perfect mastery of his 
specialty and nautical practice, must strive to improve the combat readiness and combat 
capability of the combat unit of the Fleet in every way, must be aware of the 
responsibility entrusted him, must be disciplined, and must have a state-like approach 
to the execution of missions confronting him. Only these qualities must be more 
complete and sharper in a CO than in his subordinates, for it is precisely this 
sharpness which gives him the right to lead them, to be the sole leader, to command 
the ship. 
EDITORIAL: WHICH HAY DOES THE WIND BLOW? 
With the coming of national elections and the impending close of U.S. involvement 
in the Vietnam war last fall, many members of Congress were publicly proclaiming the 
need for an end to the draft and military cutbacks for all the services. With this 
in mind the Defense Department outlined a Military Realignment Program of 274 
specific actions that were to yield a $3.5 billion savings over the next ten years. 
With the initiation of these planned cutbacks the same members of Congress who had 
demanded the cutbacks cried foul when their states' interests were involved. 
These same critics who called for an end to the draft and the establishment of an 
all-volunteer armed force now criticize the increased pay and incentive programs 
instituted to recruit this same force. Additionally they cry out against what they 
consider will be an army of "mercenaries" composed of the lower class, since only the 
: 'economically and mentally disadvantaged" will enlist I 
Throughout all of this shifting and haggling where is the American public? 
Having been treated to a box seat in the Vietnam war with the heavy press and television 
coverage for the last ten years, and now subjected to the soap opera melodrama of 
Watergate, the average American citizen is mired in apathy. It is a pretty sad 
commentary on our democracy when the only issue that has been able to stir our citizenry 
to move away from the TV set to write a letter to his Congressman or Senator has been 
the one of putting food into his stomach at a reasonable price. 
